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￿ To compensate for the inflexibility of fixed exchange rates, the euro
area needs flexibility through a system of orderly debt restructu-
ring. With virtually no room for macroeconomic manoeuvring since
the crisis onset, fiscal austerity has been the main instrument for
achieving reductions in public debt levels; but because austerity
also weakens growth, public debt ratios have barely budged. Aus-
terity has also implied continued high private debt ratios. And these
debt burdens have perpetuated economic stasis. Economic theory,
history, and the recent experience all call for a principled debt re-
structuring mechanism as an integral element of the euro area’s
design. Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual
claim on the sovereign), operationalised by the automatic lowering
of the debt burden upon the breach of contractually-specified
thresholds. Making debt more equity-like is also the way forward for
speedy private deleveraging. This debt-equity swap principle is a
needed shock absorber for the future but will also serve as the prin-
ciple to deal with the overhang of ‘legacy’ debt. 
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For several reasons, debt is a particularly serious macroeconomic problem in the euro area. 
Public debt ratios are high by international historical standards, with no immediate prospect of a 
significant reduction. Private – corporate and household – debt ratios are either flat or rising. Banks 
remain fragile and impose a contingent liability on the public purse. The most stressed economies 
have not had the option of renewing economic growth through exchange rate depreciation and a boost 
to exports. Thus, fiscal austerity has been their principal instrument to achieve debt reduction. But 
since austerity also hurts growth, the debt ratios have barely budged. Persistent low growth has also 
created deflationary tendencies, which further raises the challenge of debt reduction.  
The presumption going into this crisis had been that markets would tolerate high debt burdens 
in advanced economies, as has been the case for Japan. But that presumption has been belied for the 
euro-area economies. The risk premia required on euro-area sovereign debt have come down from 
extraordinary levels, but the interest rates presently being paid are high for many and for some they 
are well above (the optimistic) projected GDP growth rates. To make a serious dent on debt ratios, 
austerity will need to be substantial and sustained. As such, with no immediate prospect of an external 
demand stimulus, growth will remain persistently anaemic with long-term damage to growth potential. 
The risk is clear: the euro area may be trapped in a high debt-low growth trap. 
The euro area faces two questions: what should be done about the existing (so-called ‘legacy’) 
debt and, assuming that the present problems are resolved, what can be done to limit the re-
emergence of debt problems. The history of recent crises favours a concerted effort to restructure the 
legacy debt. Without such an effort, the vulnerabilities will persist.  
In addition, a forward-looking approach to debt restructuring is needed. In choosing to forgo 
exchange rate flexibility, the euro area constrained its macroeconomic options and is, therefore, 
exposed to recurrent debt and financial crises. This conclusion arises essentially from the operation of 
the so-called macroeconomic financial ‘trilemma’. An economy with a fixed exchange rate that 2 
experiences a sudden drop in demand does not have the option of expeditiously depreciating its 
nominal and (hence) real exchange rate. Lacking that adjustment mechanism, such an economy faces 
the risk of loss of confidence, capital outflows, and higher interest rates, which feedback into further 
depressing the domestic economy. Where otherwise there may have been a speculative attack on the 
exchange rate, the speculation will focus on the rise in interest rates, elevating the risk of a financial 
crisis. This tendency for real interest rates to experience large swings – with potential overshooting on 
the downside and the upside, causing a particularly acute tendency for booms and busts – has been 
well understood not only in the emerging markets literature (Lahiri and Vegh, 2003) but also in 
interpreting the breakdown of the European Monetary System in 1992 (Svensson, 1994).  
To limit such swings, a credible debt restructuring mechanism is needed. The only way to 
achieve credibility is through debt contracts that embed automatic reduction of debt burdens once the 
debt ratio crosses an agreed threshold. For example, the contract could specify automatic extension of 
repayment durations when the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches an agreed threshold. Such contracts would 
ensure the orderly and timely reduction of debt by eliminating the ex post decision to restructure and 
the inevitable policy-induced delays in restructuring. That, in turn, will lower the risk of the initial shock 
morphing into an engulfing debt, banking, and growth crisis. A desirable feature of the contracts is that, 
by pricing of the subsidy due to the current presumption of bailouts, the more expensive debt would 
reduce the tendency for over-indebtedness. This proposal for sovereign ‘cocos’ is very much in the 
spirit of the growing regulatory requirement that banks hold contingent bonds convertible into equity 
when their equity ratios fall below an agreed threshold.  
Why do we need such a radical innovation in sovereign debt contracts? To answer that 
question, it is helpful to step back into the history of crises. By 1987, five years after the start of the 
Latin American debt crisis, scholars and policymakers were engaged in an active debate on the scope 
and form of needed debt restructuring. Modest restructuring of public debts, mainly through extending 3 
the duration of repayment, had proven insufficient. Then, as now, high debt levels coexisted with 
constrained growth opportunities. Feldstein (1987) favoured a ‘muddling through’ approach, one that 
involved private voluntary deals with the creditors. Fisher (1987) pointed to more radical possibilities, 
and Sachs (1990) concluded that the time for more radical approaches had come. The Brady Plan, 
instituted in 1989, achieved a substantial lowering of debt burdens, which proved essential to renew 
growth opportunities in Latin America. 
Barkbu, Mody, and Eichengreen (2012) argue that after the Latin American debt crisis, as 
global capital flows grew to levels not seen in the post-war period, policymakers became more reticent 
in imposing losses on private creditors. The fear of contagion and the perception of challenges in 
coordinating dispersed bond holders were among the reasons for this shift in attitude. Instead, 
distressed sovereigns received increasingly higher levels of official funding. Such funding was 
intended to enable repayment of private creditors while the sovereigns undertook economic 
adjustment to regain an independent ability to honour their debts. The strategy worked well for the 
Mexican tequila crisis and the Asian crisis. Sharp exchange rate depreciations and strong world 
economic growth allowed for so-called V-shaped economic recoveries and the risk of crises quickly 
faded. But later in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the debt burdens proved too high for some; Russia, 
Uruguay and Argentina were prominent instances of sovereign debt restructuring. 
The euro-area crisis was, at least implicitly, treated as an East Asia-like crisis. Although debt 
ratios were substantially higher than in all prior post-war crises, debt restructuring was not viewed as a 
primary option. Instead, the trend towards greater reliance on official financing and fiscal adjustment 
was taken to a new level of intensity. The size of the financing packages and the degree of fiscal 
adjustment pursued were unprecedentedly large (Barkbu, Eichengreen, and Mody, 2012, Pisani-Ferry, 
Sapir, and Wolff, 2013, and Eichengreen et al, 2013). In retrospect, there were four reasons for 
rejecting debt restructuring. The first, once again, was the risk of financial contagion. Second, the 4 
technicalities of debt restructuring are also thought to have restrained the authorities, although, as 
Buchheit, Gulati, and Tirado (2013) highlighted, such impediments were largely surmountable. Third, 
the premise was that the euro-area economies were institutionally strong and, as such, would quickly 
resume growth, which would defang the debt crisis. Judging by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook of 
April 2010, the expected sources of growth were both domestic and international, with world trade 
growing at a smart clip. But there was a serious misreading of the depth of the linkages between fragile 
banks, public debt, and economic growth prospects. Finally, the costs of the delays in restructuring 
were underestimated. When the Greek debt was ultimately written down, debt ratios were 
astronomically high and Greek banks and the rest of the economy had been trapped in depression-like 
conditions. The wait in Cyprus until bank credit reached the astonishingly high level of about 900 
percent of GDP made the costs of haircuts on large bank depositors – and ultimately on the Cypriot 
economy – also dismally large (see Miller and Thomas, 2013).  
A few voices did call for debt restructuring early on. The inevitability of Greek debt restructuring 
was evident to many non-official observers and the costs of delays were highlighted, in particular, by 
Lee Buchheit. The official position between late 2009 and early 2011 was that Greek debt was 
sustainable. But by late 2010, even in official circles there was a growing sense that all was not well. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France agreed at their Deauville 
summit in October 2010 to a forward-looking debt restructuring process. After 2013, financial 
assistance to sovereigns from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would require losses imposed 
on their private creditors. Following the bilateral Deauville agreement, this principle was adopted by 
the European Council. 
The European Council decision, however, was vague and open-ended. As such, Gianviti et al 
(2010) offered a proposal that built on Anne Krueger’s (2002) Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (SDRM). In 2002, then First Deputy Managing Director, Anne Krueger, had proposed an 5 
approach towards the orderly, predictable, and rapid restructuring of unsustainable debt. In her 
summary, Krueger (2002) had emphasised that delays to debt restructuring were costly for all parties 
concerned and unfair to several debt holders.  
There is a fundamental practical problem with such debt restructuring proposals. The policy 
instinct in the midst of a crisis is that restructuring is a good idea but not while the crisis is raging. The 
position is that a system of transparent rules needs to be established during calm years and be 
applied to forewarned investors during crises. But during the calm years, the interest in restructuring is 
hard to sustain, as the fate of the original Krueger proposal demonstrates. By induction, therefore, debt 
restructuring is never established policy. The Krueger proposal offered the prospect of streamlined 
debt restructuring; but because it did not create a binding commitment, it did not address the instinct 
to defer. 
Thus, the history of the last two-and-a-half decades of crises has forged a view and practice of 
debt restructuring that is directly contrary to the needs of the euro area’s needs. An overhaul is 
needed, with benefits beyond the euro area. The framework I describe in this paper shifts the focus 
from ex post restructuring to ex ante contractual commitments to reduce the net present value of debt. 
As a framework, it only points to the general direction of needed change; creating a new form of debt 
contract would require significant policy and legal investment. With all such proposals, there is ground 
for scepticism since establishing new paths is always challenging. Eichengreen (1991), for example, 
describes the sorry track record of globally-motivated debt restructuring proposals during the inter-war 
years. The reason to offer the proposal in this paper is that the euro-area debt restructuring could occur 
on an unprecedented scale and, looking ahead, given the exchange rate inflexibility, debt restructuring 
must be integral to a stable euro area. The premise is that it will eventually be in the self-interest of the 
euro area to have a robust policy – one that could set a precedent for others to adopt.  6 
The essential idea underlying the framework proposed in this paper follows from Sims (2001) 
who argues that debt itself must be the buffer to debt shocks. For countries with their own currencies, 
sovereign debt denominated in local currency (fiat debt) is like equity issued by private firms. Inflation 
erodes the value of debt (creating automatic partial default), serving an efficient function. When 
surprise shocks increase the debt burden, austerity (through reactive changes in taxes and 
expenditures) generates higher economic costs than imposing automatic default on creditors. In this 
sense, debt denominated in nominal terms is a superior shock absorber than other fiscal responses.  
In the gold standard countries, where the inflation option was not available, maturity 
extensions were enforced when the debt burden reached excessive levels (Sims, 2001). Eichengreen 
(1991), moreover, notes that countries chose to go off the gold standard for periods of time to 
depreciate their currencies and stimulate their domestic economies. Despite recent orthodoxy to the 
contrary, history is quite clear: creditors expect and learn to accommodate partial default; the 
theoretical underpinnings of equilibrium default cycles have most directly been explored by 
Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007). The euro area has cut itself off from all shock-absorbing options: 
exchange rates have been ‘irrevocably’ fixed and the range of plausible inflation is insufficient to play 
its traditional role (indeed, the debt crisis may be amplified by deflation). Debt recontracting is the 
only vent, now and in the future.  
The task is to make debt recontracting a less dramatic event. Sovereign cocos, by rendering 
debt more equity-like, move us in that direction. They can also help create a unified framework for 
reducing the debt overhang throughout the economy. In the private sector, debt-equity exchanges are 
more conventional and straightforward; they can be used both for banks’ liabilities and their assets.  
The proposed approach may be seen as an extension of other reform proposals. Other 
proposals rely on making it easier to renegotiate the repayment amounts and schedule. That, for 
instance, was the intent of the Deauville Agreement. Lee Buchheit has designed methods for diluting 7 
the rights of creditors at the time of needed debt restructuring (Buchheit, 2011 and Buchheit, Gulati, 
and Tirado, 2013). While these approaches seek to achieve the same objective as I set out, their 
tactics and implementation strategies differ in two ways. First, because they lack automaticity, every 
occasion for debt restructuring creates its own sense of crisis, including the trotting out of discredited 
claims on the costs of debt restructuring. Hence, inevitably there are delays, which are costly. Second, 
the exact timing of the restructuring – and the negotiating position of various creditors (including their 
political sponsors) – creates arbitrariness and inequity in the distribution of losses.  
  The paper begins by discussing the nature and extent of the debt problem in Europe, including 
the fiscal response to rising debt ratios. It then describes the euro area’s ‘war of attrition’ in choosing 
between more private debt restructuring and official debt forgiveness. A theme of this section is that 
each country situation has been treated as sui generis and hence the decisions have been reactive 
and ad hoc. The serious consequence is that official debt, having been used to repay private creditors, 
has tended de facto to be relegated to a junior status vis-à-vis private debt. Next, using the bond 
market’s reaction to policy decisions during the course of the crisis, I find that fears of adverse market 
reaction against debt restructuring are overstated – and that financial markets would welcome a 
reasonable but clear restructuring policy. In the final two substantive sections, I outline the economic 
principles that lead to treating sovereign debt as equity and then illustrate the principle through 
several examples; in doing so, I highlight the need for supportive institutional and practical 
innovations. At their core, these ideas provide for a credible return of the European Monetary Union to 
its foundational principle of a ‘no bailout’ policy. 
The euro-area’s debt problem 
 
A public debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent in an ‘advanced’ economy places it in the top 15 
percent of the debt-ratio observations recorded in the last 150 years (IMF, 2012). The global financial 8 
crisis that started in 2007 jolted debt ratios above that salient threshold in several countries. Nowhere 
is this more so than in the euro area, where the number of countries above or near this threshold is 
large, and growing. The consequence also is that the debt ratios in the euro area are much higher than 
in financial crises of the last 30 years. Those previous crises were centred in emerging economies, 
where the debt was predominantly owed to foreigners in foreign currency and the debt ratios were 
typically below 60 percent of GDP (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003).  
The euro area’s response to its high (and still rising) debt levels has been fiscal consolidation 
(‘austerity’). But despite vigorous efforts, as the crisis has morphed into the Great Recession – or, 
more accurately, into the ‘Lesser Depression’ – the challenge of restoring debt to more manageable 
levels has proven frustratingly elusive. This is not a surprise. The IMF (2012) analysis documents that 
fiscal consolidation works to lower public debt ratios only when complemented with either stimulative 
domestic policy (which depreciates the exchange rate) or strong external demand. Neither of these 
supporting factors is at present an option for the euro area. 
But it gets worse. While some part of the public debt reflects costs incurred to stabilise 
domestic banks, the task of resolving banking problems is far from unfinished. Banks throughout the 
euro area remain in varying degrees of distress and create significant contingent liabilities for their 
governments. The central importance of banks arises not just because they create a direct financing 
burden for governments, but also because weak banks contribute to weakness in output growth and 
limit the options for reducing the private debt overhang (e.g., underwater mortgages). This three-fold 
link between public debt, distressed banks, and an anaemic non-financial private sector is, in principle, 
present in all crises, but it is particularly severe in the euro area. In the grip of this dynamic, the most 
vulnerable countries create a drag on other European economies. And with Europe slowing down, the 
drag extends to the world economy – Europe’s internal problems are no longer its own. 9 
Faced with this challenge, European policymakers had three choices: restructure private debt 
(‘burn the bondholders’), offer highly concessional official finance to the distressed economies, and 
rely on fiscal austerity. The initial approach pursued was an almost exclusive reliance on austerity; 
even where the limits of austerity became clear and the other options became inevitable (especially 
the increasing reliance on concessional official debt), the commitment to austerity has remained. 
Estimates of a fiscal solvency equation, which relates the primary fiscal balance to public debt ratios 
and the output gap, confirm that in the face a severe and protracted downturn, the countries of the euro 
area pursued a fiscal policy that was aggressively directed to a reduction in primary fiscal balances to 
control public debt ratios; this implied that scope for countercyclical fiscal support was much more 
limited than in other advanced economies. In combination with high fiscal multipliers, the outcome 
was slower growth and, hence, little impact on the public or private debt ratios.  
Debt ratios 
 
The public debt-to-GDP ratios have increased across all advanced economies since the so-
called subprime crisis erupted in the United States in 2007 (Figure 1). The escalation of the debt 
problems in the euro area, however, stands out. Four of the six countries in the midst of the persisting 
European crisis – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy – have public debt-to-GDP ratios that are already 
above 100 percent of GDP. The Spanish debt-to-GDP ratio in late 2012 was still in the 90 percent range 
but is projected to rise above 100 percent by 2018, and such is also the case with Cyprus. Elsewhere 
in the euro area, Belgium has remained largely insulated from the sense of crisis despite a debt ratio of 
over 100 percent. France is headed towards that same threshold, and even the German public debt 
ratio is over 80 percent. Both Belgium and France have episodically moved in and out of the market’s 
radar screen. If Italian debt were to be perceived unsustainable, Belgium and France would likely be 
considered vulnerable. 10 
Figure 1: Trends in public debt ratios 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
 
There is a view that advanced economies are different: high debt ratios are less serious, some 
claim, than for emerging economies. IMF (2012) claims that their despite much higher debt-to-GDP 
ratios, advanced country defaults over the past nearly two centuries have been rare and not relevant 
for current conditions.
1 This ignores temporary suspensions of payments in the interwar years by 
some gold standard economies (Bordo and Kydland, 1990, and Eichengreen, 1991). A particularly 
unfortunate statement on the insulation of advanced economies from debt default is from another IMF 
study (Cottarelli et al, 2010), a statement made just months before the Greek default. Several analysts 
had seen the writing on the wall (Calomiris, 2010, Zingales, 2010, and Buiter and Rahbari, 2010).  
In the euro area, the severe instability consequences arose in large part because banks and 
sovereigns were quickly joined at the hip (Mody and Sandri, 2012). Indeed, the overleveraged euro-
area banks were arguably at the centre of the crisis from where the sovereign debt crisis unfolded. 
Greece was different in this respect (in as much as the problems started with the sovereign) but in all 
                                                            
1 “Among our 26 episodes, only 3 feature default: Germany (1918), which suspended war reparations in 1932, and Greece 
(1888, 1931), which defaulted in 1894 and 1932, respectively. These episodes have little relevance for the challenges 
faced by advanced economies today…” (IMF, 2012, p. 106). 11 
countries (including in Greece) the sovereign and domestic banks were intertwined, with governments 
bearing the implicit responsibility of banks’ debt. These sovereign-bank links have heightened the 
crisis, raising its intensity and prolonging its length. Any analysis of euro area debt must be mindful of 
the joint dynamics of public and bank debt. 
A further vicious loop may be operating in the euro area. A step-up in economic growth is the 
only sustainable route to debt reduction. But high debt levels have operated through various channels 
to limit growth possibilities. First, efforts to reduce public-debt ratios through fiscal austerity have had 
virtually no success since austerity curtails growth. Second, recent studies on debt and deleveraging 
show that private deleveraging has moved very slowly in the euro area relative to the pace in the 
United States (Figures 2a and 2b, and Roxburgh et al 2012). Indeed, according to the latest available 
data, euro-area household and corporate debt ratios were still rising in 2011, while in the US these 
ratios were falling for households in most states and were flat for corporates. In the US, despite delays 
in implementation, debt forgiveness has allowed households some respite.
2 Third, euro area’s 
overleveraged banks with weak balance sheets must dispose of assets (possibly at fire sale values) 
before they are able to lend again. Low growth, in turn, further erodes banks’ asset values and pushes 
up public debt ratios. Together, then, low growth and high debt ratios are likely to persist before some 
relief is evident.
3 The implication also is that financial vulnerability will remain elevated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2 Irish households have increasing arrears on their mortgages. Some see this as a sign of “strategic default.” There may be 
an element of that; but what is surprising is the low level of arrears in other countries, which is not credible. Similarly, recent 
reports show that Irish small and medium firms are falling behind on their payments to banks. Once again, this makes 
sense—an economy in which GDP is still almost 10 percent below its peak output level and with unemployment in the 14 
percent range (and massive hidden unemployment), distress of the non-financial sector is to be expected. 
3 At a press conference in January 2013, to the question “Is Europe on the mend?” the IMF chief economist, Olivier 
Blanchard responded somewhat helplessly: “Something has to happen to start growth.” 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/world/imf-cuts-global-growth-forecast-1.1071797 
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Figure 2a: Household debt/income ratios: euro area vs. US states 
  
Sources: Eurostat, BEA and New York FED 
HDD/DI shows percentage change in the household debt over disposable income ratio (the word 
increase indicates that positive numbers show an increase in the HDD/DI ratio). The percentage change 
in the HHD/DI ratio is decomposed between percentages changes in HHD per capita and changes in DI 
per capita (the word decrease indicates that the variable is inverted, positive numbers mean a decline 
in disposable income per capita). All variations are calculated as logarithmic approximations. 
 
Figure 2b: Corporate debt/GDP ratios: euro-area countries and United States 
 
Sources: Eurostat and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
  How aggressive has euro-area fiscal austerity been? The principal policy for reducing 
sovereign debt has been the effort to reduce the primary fiscal deficit (the deficit not including interest 
payments). A simple way to assess how aggressive the primary balance reduction effort has been is to 
estimate the so-called ‘solvency’ equations, pioneered by Bohn (1995, 1998). Following Mendoza and 
Ostry (2007), I report estimates for a panel of advanced economies for the period 1995 to 2013 
(where the 2013 data are projections). The estimates correct for autocorrelation. The dependent 13 
variable is the primary balance, which is regressed on the public debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the 
previous year and on the output gap. All data are from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, October 2012. 
Bohn (1995) has shown that a positive coefficient on the public debt-to-GDP ratio, i.e., a rise in the 
primary balance as response to a rise in the debt ratio, implies that the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint is satisfied and hence debt-to-GDP ratios should decline over time.
4  
  Table 1 shows during the Tech Bubble phase (1995-2001), the primary surplus response to 
changes in debt ratios was limited. The primary surplus did move with the business cycle: as the 
output gap increased (output rose relative to potential), primary surpluses increased (due to higher 
tax revenues and reduced support for unemployment and other cyclical benefits). There was 
somewhat greater response to debt ratios during the Greenspan Put era (2002-2007) and a somewhat 
lower response to the business cycle (possibly indicating that the governments were assuming that 
the good times would last but were also paying down debt).
5 Once the Great Recession (2008-2013) 
started, debt ratios rose sharply and primary deficits rose. Thus, the economic slowdown made fiscal 
positions much more challenging but the need to pay down debt became more urgent. This trade-off 
essentially implied a pacing of the fiscal consolidation and we see, in Table 2, that it was treated very 
differently in and out of the euro area. 
  
                                                            
4 The euro-area countries in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and Spain. Slovenia is in the Eurozone from 2007, the Slovak Republic from 2009, and Estonia from 2011. The 
non-euro area countries include: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. 
5 The Greenspan Put era refers to the idea that the U.S. Federal Reserve under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan was 
prone to reduce interest rates to maintain a floor on stock prices. 14 
Table 1: Fiscal solvency estimates: all advanced economies, 1995-2013 
  Dependent Variable: Primary Fiscal Balance/GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
   Tech Bubble
(1995-2001)
Greenspan Put
(2002-2007) 
Great Recession 
(2008-2013) 
  
Public Debt-to-GDP ratio  -0.00 0.04*** 0.09** 
 [-0.22] [3.17] [2.12] 
Output Gap  0.47*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 
 [3.59] [6.21] [5.30] 
Constant 2.18 -2.23** -8.34** 
 [1.52] [-2.60] [-2.51] 
  
Observations 114 131 142 
R-squared 0.200 0.173 0.188 
Number of countries  21 23 24 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2: Fiscal solvency: how the euro area responded to the Great Recession 
Dependent Variable: Primary Fiscal Balance/GDP
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
   Euro Nations: 
Greenspan Put
(2002-2007) 
Euro Nations: 
Great Recession
(2008-2013) 
Non-Euro Nations:  
Greenspan Put 
(2002-2007) 
Non-Euro Nations: 
Great Recession 
(2008-2013) 
Public Debt-to-GDP   0.06***  0.14*** 0.04* -0.01
Ratio [4.72]  [3.23] [1.93] [-0.21]
Output Gap  0.16*  0.53*** 0.36*** 0.35***
 [2.07]  [5.35] [9.88] [10.37]
Constant -2.80**  -11.57*** -2.33** -2.13
 [-2.84]  [-3.32] [-2.35] [-0.76]
    
Observations 66  80 65 62 
R-squared 0.0932  0.295 0.298 0.208
Number of countries  12  14 12 12 
Public Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.04* -0.01
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notice in Table 2 that for the euro area, the Great Recession was associated with higher 
elasticity of primary surpluses to the output gap relative to the Greenspan Put period (as indicated for 
the full sample in Table 1): actual output being considerably less than potential, primary surpluses 
tended to fall sharply. Conditional on the output gap, the response to debt during the Great Recession 15 
period was large in the euro area: it was much larger than in the non-euro area countries (where 
actually the ratio fell) and it was larger than its own ratio in the Greenspan Put era.  
These estimates show that the euro area took the debt reduction business much more 
seriously than did the non-euro area economies. That may have been because of the higher debt ratios 
in the euro area, with fiscal consolidation viewed as the primary solution to these growing debts. To be 
clear, these equations are also saying that the strategy worked, in as much as the austerity would act 
eventually to lower debt-to-GDP ratios. But as recent analysis has also shown, there were 
consequences. Fiscal multipliers proved to be much higher than anticipated (Blanchard and Leigh, 
2013), multipliers tend to be high when output is barely growing (Baum et al, 2012) and the 
consequence, at first, is an increase in debt-to-GDP ratios (Eylard and Weber, 2013). The short-term 
rise in debt ratios is aggravated if an attempt is made to further hasten fiscal consolidation, to achieve 
it in one sustained drive. But, as Blanchard (2013) notes, the real problem arises from the long-term 
effects of prolonged fiscal consolidation. He refers to various ‘vicious cycles’ setting in – an increase in 
long-term unemployment and persistent fall in investment that reduce the economy’s growth 
capacity. 
   16 
No bailout: the euro area’s war of attrition  
 
Dealing with the debt overhang in the euro area should have been a simple matter. The 
monetary union was constructed on the ‘no bailout’ principle – sovereigns unable to repay their debt 
would negotiate reduced payments directly with their creditors. But the principle was quietly 
abandoned when it was put to the test. Instead, a series of reactive and ad hoc responses followed as 
the crisis unfolded. It was reactive in the sense that debt restructuring was seen as a last-resort option; 
it was ad hoc in the sense that each event was treated de novo and its uniqueness was emphasised. 
After nearly five years of crisis management, no general principle has emerged as an alternative to ‘no 
bailout.’ While the choices in dealing with ‘legacy’ debt (the debt stock from this ongoing crisis) are 
narrowing, the future course of euro-area debt policy remains as unclear as ever. 
The counter to such a rear-view mirror recommendation of more debt restructuring early on is 
that the threat of contagion was large in the euro-area context. In particular, banks would have become 
even more vulnerable if haircuts were imposed on their holdings of sovereign debt. The threat of 
contagion is always difficult to deny. But the evidence in other contexts and in the euro-area crisis 
suggests strongly that markets recognise the strength of different balance sheets (Bordo and Murshid, 
2001, Bordo and Schwartz, 1999, and especially Forbes, 2012, who analyses contagion within the 
euro-area economies and concludes that countries with highly leveraged financial institutions are 
vulnerable to external shocks but the evidence for ‘wake-up call’ contagion – that due to perceived 
similarity – is weak). Instead, markets prefer the certainty of debt restructuring to the uncertainty of an 
ad hoc process with no imminent resolution of the underlying debt problem. Where contagion 
nevertheless surfaces, monetary authorities have the tools to aggressively defend ‘innocent 
bystanders’ (Blinder, 2013).  
In this section, I interpret euro-area crisis management as a ‘war of attrition.’ Abandoning the 
euro is too costly but moving ahead with a more complete union is politically infeasible in the 17 
timeframe of current crisis. If default on private debt is deemed an instrument of last resort, the only 
escape from a prolonged state of crisis is the elixir of growth. That elixir not having materialised, the 
strategy of large official financing, along with fiscal austerity as the main adjustment tool, is creating 
its own anomalies. In particular, official debt is being unwittingly subordinated to private debt, 
generating serious long-term risks. In Cyprus, this process was preempted before bank debt 
transformed into sovereign debt. Large bank depositors are being converted into equity holders. Since 
the bank debt had de facto become sovereign debt, the adaptation of these principles to sovereign 
debt would appear to be the next step. 
The contradictions in the euro-area’s sovereign debt policies can be traced to the two different 
ways the phrase ‘no bailout’ has been used.
 6  
•  Public-to-public bailouts. Articles 123 and 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) prohibit these. No European sovereign, the European Union, or the 
European Central Bank (ECB) may ‘bail out’ a member state. This – the official ‘no bailout’ – is a 
legal injunction against assuming the financial liabilities or commitments of other 
governments.  
•  Public-to-private bailouts. Private creditors are said to have been ‘bailed out’ if they are paid 
their dues in full, in part by borrowing new money from official sources. Thus, private ‘no 
bailout’ (or, equivalently, private ‘bail in’) occurs when the sovereign defaults on the debts 
owed to private creditors. Enforcing ‘no bailout’ on private creditors is a policy decision, not a 
legal requirement.  
                                                            
6 Although the IMF was involved in this process, I do not treat the IMF voice as a distinctive one. The public views of the IMF 
were consistent with those of the European authorities (e.g., Cottarelli et al, 2010). The March 2011 Staff Report on the third 
review of the Greek programme concluded that Greek public debt was sustainable in the “baseline scenario” (IMF, 2011a, p. 
10). While the report noted the risks, it also interpreted economic developments and policy decisions taken as signs of 
progress. Recently, the IMF has issued a mea culpa, suggesting after all that not restructuring Greek debt early on was an 
error. But other voices from the IMF continue believe that the right course was adopted. 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-572642. 18 
The official and private ‘no bailout’ decisions are logically and practically connected. Fidelity to 
the official ‘no bailout’ legal requirement requires adherence to a private ‘no bailout’ policy. If official ‘no 
bailout’ were strictly applied, sovereigns in distress would be unable to fully repay their privately-held 
debt and the creditors would suffer losses. For this reason, the policy decision to repay private lenders 
required official financing of distressed sovereigns, diluting the official ‘no bailout’ principle. But such 
dilution strikes at the treaty commitment, which undermines the core principles on which the 
monetary union was founded.  
The interconnections extend further. If the threat of imposing losses on private creditors were 
rendered credible by adherence to the official ‘no bailout’ commitment, private creditors would have a 
greater (though not iron-clad) incentive to discipline sovereign borrowers, and the likelihood of 
sovereign distress and the need for official bailouts would fall. Sovereigns would tend to pay higher 
interest rates and borrow less, resulting in a logically-consistent and more stable equilibrium than is 
presently the case. Instead, the effort has been to square the circle of enforcing ‘no official bailout’ 
while approving private bailout. Severe fiscal austerity has been the outcome. 
Because of these tensions, the euro-area authorities have walked a tight rope in dealing with 
the two ‘no bailouts.’ Early on, starting with Greece, the decision was to make private creditors whole. 
Since that required substantial official funding for distressed sovereigns, new official financing 
mechanisms were set up. Whether the funding channelled through such mechanisms violates the ‘no 
bailout’ required by the TFEU has been a continuing source of angst. Whelan (2013) argues that 
lending to other sovereigns may not violate the treaties and although the courts have been cooperative 
in this regard, the officials themselves regard the legal position as blurred. This is particularly so as the 
terms on official lending are being necessarily eased for fear of aggravating the debt burdens of the 
distressed sovereigns, and such easing has to be justified as being in compliance with the legal ‘no 
bailout’ requirement. At the same time, as the costs of such concessional finance are being revealed, 19 
the issue is acquiring greater political salience and the willingness by creditor governments to provide 
open-ended official funding is being tested, resulting in episodic and opportunistic losses imposed on 
private creditors. Three examples demonstrate the problematic conflicts and uncertainties that have 
resulted. 
Three examples 
 
Consider first the dreadful euphemism Official Sector Involvement (OSI). This refers to the 
various forms in which the terms of official lending are being eased. The most widely-known example 
is the extension of maturities in Greece. Substantial official funds were at first used to repay private 
creditors under the assumption that Greek debt would be sustainable – Greece would repay all its debt 
including official loans. When that assumption proved invalid, a belated effort was made to bail in the 
remaining private creditors. That proved too little, too late, besides being grossly unfair. Following a 
publicly-conducted debate, the decision was to stretch out the repayment of Greece’s official debt 
repayment obligations with the goal of lowering its debt-to-GDP ratio to about 120% about a decade 
from now. Given the sorry track record of macro projections in the first two years of the Greek 
programme, the claim of hitting that precise debt ratio several years down the line was a political 
outcome rather than reflecting credible economic analysis. Even if the target were miraculously 
achieved, it is highly improbable that debt at that level would be sustainable. More official forgiveness 
will be needed but will be dragged out over several years. The legal and political barriers continue to 
prevent decisive debt reduction needed to allow Greece a reasonable opportunity of regaining control 
over its own economic future.  
An important subsequent decision was to allow Ireland to repay its obligations under the so-
called Promissory Notes over an extended time period. With less fanfare, but in fairness to the other 
recipients of official financing, there has been significant cumulative reduction in the Irish and 20 
Portuguese debt burdens through extended maturities and lower interest rates. OSI has become 
integral to the resolution of the euro-area crisis. 
Is OSI consistent with the ‘no bailout’ injunctions of the TFEU? The European Court of Justice in 
the so-called Pringle decision concludes that official lending does not violate the ‘no bailout’ 
commitment if it safeguards the financial stability of the euro area (ECJ, 2012, p. 13). But the same 
decision adds that the loaned amounts must be repaid with “an appropriate margin.” Of course, what 
constitutes an appropriate margin is a policy decision. But for this to be legally consistent, the 
interpretation must also be that the appropriate margin can change from the original contract to reflect 
new developments.  
In the meanwhile, the President of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, has publicly voiced 
misgivings on the legality of the Irish Promissory Notes deal (Cahill, 2013). These legal misgivings are 
real but they confront the inevitability of more OSI for reducing the legacy, unsustainable debt. The 
legal questions apart, there is a further, possibly-unintended but serious, policy consequence. To the 
extent that OSI reduces sovereign debt burdens and permits renewed private borrowing, as is 
happening for Ireland and Portugal, official credit will have, in effect, become junior to private credit. 
The signal to private creditors is that official funds (at possibly increasingly concessional terms) will 
be used to repay private debt.
7 
A second example refers to the decision by the European Stability Mechanism (the ESM) to 
lend to the Government of Spain on a pari passu basis: in the event of a default, the ESM would have 
the same rights as private creditors. The ESM (2012, p. 6) reports that normally its loans will: “…enjoy 
preferred creditor status in a similar fashion to those of the IMF, while accepting preferred creditor 
status of the IMF over the ESM.” In other words, under normal practice, the indebted sovereign will first 
repay the IMF, then the ESM, and the private creditors would be the residual claimants. The decision to 
                                                            
7 Not surprisingly, President Weidmann has also taken up the cause against the European Central Bank’s much-acclaimed 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme for similar reasons. 21 
forgo the preferred creditor status in the Spanish case is explained as “one-off in nature.” By foregoing 
preferred creditor status, the ESM is, in effect, subsidising future Spanish borrowing from private 
lenders. This is yet another form of OSI with similar implications.  
The final example is from Cyprus. For the first time since the start of the crisis, the availability 
of official funds was made contingent on the bail in of private depositors (although this forward step 
was contaminated by the initial blunder of imposing a haircut on small depositors). If the sums are 
done right and the rest of the programme holds together, the Cypriot example would help create a 
better balance between official and private financing. If (a big if), following the bail in of private lenders, 
public debt levels are brought down to sustainable levels (or to less unsustainable levels), official 
funding will stand a higher likelihood of being temporary and thus be broadly consistent with the 
official ‘no bailout’ under the TFEU. For this reason, it is intriguing that the officials have been anxious to 
describe Cyprus as an exceptional case that will not be a basis for future official funding design. In his 
press conference on April 4, 2013, President Draghi of the ECB was clear: “… let me stress that Cyprus 
is not a template!” (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130404.en.html.)  
A potentially much more serious muddle relates to the relative seniority of official and private 
lenders in the context of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) initiative. Under this initiative, 
the ECB has accepted the principle of an equal or pari passu position relative to private lenders. In its 
interpretation of the TFEU, however, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, 2012) states that Article 123 
(which refers to the ECB) imposes a higher ‘no bailout’ standard on the ECB than does Article 125 
(which refers to all other official lending).
 8 For the Greek bonds that the ECB held, a prior transaction 
before the private ‘bail in’ allowed the ECB to avoid sharing the losses with private creditors. Market 
                                                            
8 As James (2012, p. 477) notes, “The involvement of monetary authorities in government finance was ruled out by the 
stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty forbidding the ECB from purchasing government bonds and the absence of support 
was a vital part of the “no bailout” philosophy woven into the Treaty (Article 104/1 of the Maastricht Treaty; Article 21 of the 
ECSB Statute; and Article 104/1 of the Lisbon Treaty).”  
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commentary has noted that the ECB may hold ‘implicit’ seniority (Cotterill, 2012), which, if exercised, 
would create new uncertainties.  
Some lessons 
 
No official bailout was the treaty obligation, and its corollary, no bailout of private creditors was 
the necessary and correct policy. The treaty has most likely been undermined, and the policy is beset 
with uncertainty. The cases discussed illustrate that maintaining the purity of the official ‘no bailout’ 
principle is virtually impossible when sovereign financial distress is significant and official funds 
continue to provide private bailouts. If the original intent of no official bailout is to be achieved, private 
creditors must be forced to significantly reduce their claims on the sovereign. An orderly mechanism of 
sovereign default (including on quasi-sovereign bank debt) needs to be in place. 
The status quo is untenable. The policy judgment appears to have been that if private creditors 
were not bailed out, financial contagion would amplify instability. Blinder (2013) reports that when the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (the FDIC) imposed large losses on the creditors of Washington 
Mutual (in the largest bankruptcy of a US bank), money market funds were placed under strain. The 
risk that they would ‘break the buck’ (not honour their commitments), caused widespread panic. The 
Federal Reserve stepped in as a lender of last resort to dampen the crisis. In the Greek case, if similar 
strains had arisen, the ECB had the resources and the ability to stem the contagion. The question also 
is whether the alternate strategy pursued – of making creditors whole – better serves the cause of 
financial stability. For one thing, the policy being pursued is ad hoc, verging on arbitrary. Indeed, the 
authorities are at pains to highlight that each case is sui generis, from the Greek private debt 
restructuring to the Cypriot depositor in bail in. As such, huge policy uncertainty remains. More 
seriously, the accumulating inference from current practice is that official creditors are willing to 
subsidise private lenders by accepting either an equal, or even a junior, status as lenders. Ritschl 23 
(2012) has written of the damaging consequences of such subordination of official claims in the 
context of German reparation payments. 
Sovereign debt as a contingent claim 
 
In his comment on Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), Sims (2003) points out that the 
accumulation of debt and the ensuing default may reflect symptoms of underlying problems, in which 
case default can be cathartic. He further argues: 
“If default occurred cleanly, without costs other than the direct costs to investors who do not 
receive promised returns and to the borrower who may face higher future borrowing costs, it 
would be hard to argue that default is in itself a problem. Default in such a world is a way to 
make debt a contingent claim, and contingent debt is a useful financing tool. In an earlier 
paper (which the authors cite), I presented a highly stylised model of such cost-free default 
that predicts many of the statistical associations uncovered in this paper: that poorer 
countries will default more often; that default is consistent with fairly prompt renewal of 
borrowing and indeed with real debt quickly exceeding predefault levels; that highly variable 
inflation rates are associated with high default probabilities; that real debt burdens are seldom 
reduced rapidly except by sudden defaults or episodes of inflation….” 
The earlier paper that Sims refers to, Sims (2001), argues that faced with an unexpected fiscal 
setback, a government has two choices: to raise taxes or engineer a partial default. Where the 
government issues debt denominated in nominal terms, the real value of debt can be eroded by 
inflation and the tax rate can set independently of the current level of debt. Shocks to the fiscal 
balance are, therefore, absorbed by unanticipated inflation, allowing “a less variable and more efficient 
time path for the tax rate” (Sims, 2001, p. 603). The inflation tax is akin to a surprise tax on capital, 
which is non-distortionary. Thus, nominal debt creates a contingent (real) claim, which is also efficient. 24 
It is in this sense that Sims describes nominal sovereign debt as more like equity than debt issued by 
private firms. Even more directly, Cochrane (2001) refers to nominal government debt as a ‘residual 
claim.’ 
The surprise inflation tax on nominal debt is automatic, with virtually no costs of 
administration. But, Sims notes that it may not always be the mechanism to implement the contingent 
claim. For example, he points out (Sims, 2001, p. 607) “at times of fiscal stress, governments under 
the gold standard would ‘suspend specie payment’, meaning that their liabilities, nominally promising 
payment in gold, could temporarily only be rolled over at maturity into new government liabilities. This 
contingency was not provided for explicitly in advance, but it was easy to implement.” Bordo and 
Kydland (1990) document such suspensions and describe the gold standard as a “contingent rule,” 
which could be suspended during emergencies and reinstated once conditions normalised.  
  Another perspective on debt as a contingent claim comes from Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(2011). These authors argue that securities that are deemed to be safe typically contain neglected 
risks – certain states of the world, certain contingencies, are not reflected in the design and pricing of 
the security. Because of limits in representing uncertainty, improbable risks are excluded from the 
calculus. The neglect of risk, Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011, p. 454) conclude, leads to over-
issuance of securities: “…there are not enough cash flows in the neglected states of the world to make 
promised payments in full.” Financial fragility arises because a small piece of bad news can cause a 
drastic revaluation of an asset, causing a flight to safety. Fragility is magnified if the assets with 
neglected risk are held by highly leveraged institutions. The flight to safety then triggers deleveraging 
with its more far reaching instability.  
  The ‘neglected risk’ view is a pithy and precise description of the euro-area crisis. Sovereign 
debt was regarded as virtually risk-free (a notion fostered by risk-free weighting of sovereign assets 
held by banks and the similar treatment accorded by the ECB). Hence, sovereign debt was held in 25 
substantial amounts by the highly-leveraged euro area banks. When the risk that the sovereigns may 
be unable to honour their debts became real, the sharp revaluation of the debt caused not only 
sovereign distress but more extensive financial panic.  
  The policy prescriptions that Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011) advocate also apply in the 
euro-area context. Issuance of apparently safe securities needs to be curbed, especially if they are 
associated with guarantees that prove onerous to honour. The corollary is that investors must be 
subject to more continuous revaluations of their assets, such that default is a more minor, less 
dramatic event. If this is their advice for money market funds, where the notion of ‘breaking the buck’ 
has been a taboo, it applies with all the more force to sovereign debt and to the goal of making such 
debt a contingent claim. 
  Finally, in the tradition of the sovereign debt literature, Rogoff (1999, p. 35) notes: “…in multi-
period models of sovereign borrowing, it is by no means the case that an efficient contract always calls 
for full debt repayment in every state of nature.” This is all the more so, he writes, in the absence of a 
lender of last resort, when temporary standstills on payments are desirable. The implicit contract 
between debtors and creditors recognises the possibility of partial repayment when economic 
outcomes are unexpectedly adverse. Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) refer to “excusable debt.” Like 
Sims (2003), they point out that default has low costs, notwithstanding its continued popular portrayal 
as a calamitous event. Thus, Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) emphasise that creditors are realistic 
about the sovereign’s ability to repay debt in certain contingencies and, for this reason, a reputational 
equilibrium can be maintained through the sovereign’s choice of current income devoted to debt 
servicing. Even more directly, Kovrijnykh, and Szentes (2007) describe ‘equilibrium’ default cycles. 
Bad shocks, they note, will lead to debt overhangs (future primary surpluses will be inadequate to 
serve current debt). It is in the interest of the lender to forgive debt and resume new lending to take 26 
advantage of new investment and growth opportunities in the borrowing economy. This will be true, 
knowing that the cycle is destined to repeat. 
  Despite current perceptions to the contrary, the costs of austerity could likely exceed those of 
default. While prolonged austerity will eventually reduce debt ratios, the persistent growth weakness 
in the interim causes lasting damage (‘the vicious circles,’ in Blanchard’s terminology). In contrast, 
scholarly analysis across centuries repeatedly finds that default has low costs because creditors allow 
for expected defaults in their lending decisions and, as such, regard forgiveness and new lending to be 
in their self-interest. Drelichman and Voth (2011) report on serial defaults by Philip II of Spain between 
1566 and 1600 and, using detailed archival data on over 400 debt contracts, find that lenders 
repeatedly agreed to easy and generous debt write-down and early resumption of new lending. They 
conclude that over these default cycles (much in the manner of the theoretical treatment by 
Kovrijnykh and Szentes, 2007), lenders made handsome profits. Eichengreen (1991, pp. 160-161) 
focuses on the widespread defaults in the inter-war period. He finds: “Countries that faithfully serviced 
their debts in the 1930s did not enjoy superior credit-market access subsequently…. Even when 
lending picked up after World War II, there remained little discernible difference in the capital-market 
access of countries that had pursued different policies toward their external debts.” Jorgenson and 
Sachs (1989) examine the same period and reach the same conclusion. Recent studies reaffirm this 
view. These studies (Panizza et al, 2009, Levy Yeyati and Panizza, 2011 and Panizza 2013) show that 
following default, the return to the market is relatively quick; although spreads rise sharply, they fall 
back quickly; and output losses are negligible (indeed, output starts rising in the quarter after the 
default). Recently, Cruces and Trebesch (2011) have determined that larger haircuts at the time of 
default are associated with larger subsequent risk premia and longer exclusion from the market.
9 Their 
                                                            
9 The study is based on 27 events, which include a number of economies that transitioned from centrally-planned to 
market systems in the early and mid-1990s as also Iraq in recent years. 27 
message is that early, even pre-emptive, restructuring that keeps haircuts in a modest range (under 
40 percent) offers debt relief with limited downside.
10 
  Why, Eichengreen (1991) rightly asks, are the costs of debt restructuring so low? His answer 
is that investors have short memories and what really matters is the credibility of the post-default 
economic policy regime. Thus, countries that defaulted in the inter-war years returned to a 
commitment to the gold standard and reclaimed standing as responsible borrowers. Jorgenson and 
Sachs (1989) go one step further and claim – as Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) and Drelichman and 
Voth (2011) do – that default is also in the interest of the creditors. Having defaulted, the borrower’s 
economic prospects improve, and creditors value that return to creditworthiness. Indeed, as Buchheit 
(2011) and Panizza (2013) emphasise, absent timely implementation of partial default, the delays in 
containing debt repayment to manageable levels imposes large costs on all parties by further 
undermining repayment capacity and ultimately distributing the burden in an inequitable and arbitrary 
manner. 
Which is worse: debt restructuring or the uncertainty? 
 
  Do the considerations outlined above apply to this crisis? I use the changes in bond spreads 
following three debt restructuring-related policy announcements to infer the market’s reaction. The 
bond spread of a country on a particular date is the risk premium yield it pays on its 10-year bonds 
over and above the yield paid on German 10-year bonds on the same date. As in Ait Sahalia et al 
(2012), I estimate the ‘abnormal cumulative change’ in bond spreads after the announcement. The 
word ‘abnormal’ refers to the counterfactual: what would have been the change absent the 
announcement. Since estimating this counterfactual is hard, Ait-Sahalia et al (2012) use the average 
                                                            
10 They do find that higher haircuts are associated with the defaulting borrower having to pay higher spreads. The penalty is 
between 1 and 2 percent higher interest rate for 5-7 years when about half the debt is written off.  28 
change over the past 20 days as the most probable direction of spreads absent the policy change. The 
cumulative abnormal change is shown over a window of 5 days after the announcement. 
  Consider first the October 19, 2010 announcement at the Deauville Summit between 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy. The details of the proposal were never spelled 
out, but the goal of making restructuring easier by 2013 was to be achieved by more widespread use 
of collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts and restructuring of privately-held debt as a 
condition for receiving official assistance from the ESM. Both these were steps in the right direction. 
CACs made debt restructuring easier and the empirical evidence suggests that borrowers other than 
the least creditworthy gain from the reduced risks of restructuring being impeded by recalcitrant 
bondholders (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000). Investors like collective action clauses. Emons (2012, p. 
3), writing for PIMCO, the giant bond investor, says: “On balance, the introduction of CACs in European 
government bond markets in 2013 is positive for investors.” Similarly, debt restructuring before the 
debt weighs on the economic recovery process is also desirable for the reasons discussed above.  
  Yet, the Deauville proposal has, almost universally, been regarded as an error, certainly for its 
timing and also for its content.
11 Since nothing in the proposal was novel, except that it was being 
applied to Europe, the basis for the criticism was the large rise in spreads in October and November 
2010. The question then boils down to whether Deauville contributed to that run-up in spreads.  
Figure 3(a) shows the abnormal changes in spreads following the announcement. For the 
periphery economies of the euro area, the average spread went up about 50 basis points (100 basis 
points equal one percentage point) by the end of the fifth day after Deauville. Much of the rise was 
accounted for by Greece, where the increase was almost 70 basis points. For Ireland, the peak rise in 
                                                            
11 It has, therefore, been convenient to blame all ills on Deauville. The IMF’s Staff Report for the Fourth Review of the Greece 
programme, published in early July, 2011, just days before the inevitable debt restructuring, finally conceded that it was 
no longer possible to say with high probability that Greek debt was sustainable (IMF, 2011b, p. 30). But even in making this 
circuitous concession, the report could not resist assigning much of the blame for the outcome to Deauville. Incredible. 
Makes one want to cry out like Cassius in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in 
ourselves, that we are underlings.” Julius Caesar (I, ii, 140-141) 
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spreads was 45 basis points; but, importantly, this peak was reached on the third day after which the 
spread began to decline. Similarly, the peak rise for Portugal was 40 basis points on the third day, after 
which again spreads fell. The Spanish and Italian rise in spreads was even smaller. 
  Not only was the rise in spreads small, it was also well within the range of variability 
established in the previous 20 days. For example, the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative 
change for Portugal was 30 basis points. So, the Portuguese increase in spreads at 40 basis points was 
just over one standard deviation of the rise in spreads during that period. Put another way, there was at 
least one 3-day period in those past 20 days when the cumulative rise was above 40 basis points. 
Thus, the rise in spreads that actually occurred was within the range established by the variability prior 
to Deauville. 
In sum, while spreads did rise in October and November of 2010, attributing that rise to 
Deauville is inappropriate. If Deauville had been the causal factor, there would have a stronger 
movement around that time. In particular, the fall in the abnormal spreads after the third day in Ireland 
and Portugal implies that Deauville created no decisive break with the past. There was, moreover, no 
sign of contagion. The relative rise in spread in the first three days reflected the differences in 
variability across countries: high for Greece, lower for Ireland and Portugal, and even lower for all 
others.
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 A concern with such analyses is that the Deauville announcement may have been anticipated and so the rise in spreads 
occurred before the actual announcement. Discussions with key participants at the time suggest that the Merkel-Sarkozy 
agreement came as a surprise. 30 
Figure 3: Sovereign bond market reactions to policy announcements 
Cumulative abnormal change (basis points) 
(a) The Deauville Agreement, October 19, 2010 
(b) The First Greek Debt Restructuring, July 22, 2011
(c) Uncertainty about Debt Restructuring in Greece, February 20, 2012 
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  On July 22, 2011, the announcement of a new Greek bailout programme included the decision 
to impose a substantial haircut on bond holders. As Figure 3(b) shows, abnormal spreads fell sharply 
not only for Greece but also for Ireland and Portugal, and the fall that was sustained over the next few 
days. Global stock markets also responded favourably despite the then prevailing uncertainty in the 
United States. As one market participant commented: “The latest deal for Greece has come as a relief 
but the focus is now back on the American deficit problem and the still stuttering economy.”
13 Thus, a 
clear statement of intent on debt restructuring helped improve market sentiment.  
But the first Greek restructuring proved insufficient. Thus, on February 20, 2012 (Figure 3(c)), 
a decision was due on the next steps, and it remained unclear what the parameters of the next stage of 
needed restructuring were.
14 This time, spreads rose. The rise in Greek spreads was so large that it is 
not shown on the chart. But other peripheral economies also lost ground; Portuguese spreads rose 
rapidly, and considerably more than did after Deauville. Thus, if there is evidence for contagion, it 
manifested itself more starkly in an uncertain context.  
  Such event analyses do not provide conclusive proof of causality. Nevertheless, the evidence, 
such as there is, cautions us that the risk of financial instability should not be a deterrent to debt 
restructuring. The evidence is also consistent with the limited costs to debtors of debt restructuring. 
The policy message is that lack of decisiveness is the more serious problem.  
Deauville was a good first step. It was a recognition that debt will not always be repaid and it 
was a beginning for establishing mechanisms for lowering the costs of debt restructuring. In particular, 
a process that related renegotiation of debt contracts to established and transparent benchmarks was 
                                                            
13 “The Eurozone Debt Crisis Plan As It Happened: July 22, 2011.” 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8654064/Eurozone-debt-crisis-plan-as-it-happened-July-22-
2011.html. 
 
14 “Greece’s Fate Uncertain as Bailout Talks Drag On.” http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/20/markets/greece/index.htm. 
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very much in the spirit of recognising debt as a contingent claim. Deauville would have initiated a move 
away from reactive posture to debt burdens – dealing with them only when there is no other choice – 
to a system that was proactive. The decision to go back on Deauville is unfortunate because that 
decision appears to have been based on a superficial reading of the evidence, a reading that has 
provided a convenient focal point for the critics of debt restructuring. Moreover, even if the market had, 
in fact, reacted adversely, the decision to change course was not the logical conclusion. A rise in 
spreads – if it had occurred – would only have revealed a subsidy on account of an untenable 
expectation of bailout of private creditors.  
Contingent debt for the euro-area crisis 
 
Two problems need solutions: the legacy debt and a system for the future. Legacy debt – the 
‘debt overhang’ – is a problem if its size deters voluntary new lending to the country. Legacy debt, as 
Krugman (1988) noted, must either be financed by new (possibly official) money or it must be 
forgiven (restructured). The early presumption in the euro area was that financing would be sufficient; 
over time, that has proven untenable, and private and official loans are increasingly (though slowly) 
being forgiven. Some may argue that this ad hoc approach, even if not elegant, is making headway; 
and with the hard work already behind us, changing course at this stage could be disruptive. An 
alternative view is that instituting a more orderly and predictable system that encompasses legacy 
debt is essential because slow and uncertain pace of restructuring is costly; it acts as a drag on 
investment and growth and leads to a continuing rise in debt burdens. But, as important, the 
architecture of the euro area has a major gap without a debt restructuring mechanism and that gap 
needs to be filled.  
For both the legacy debt and for the forward-looking framework, a unified approach is feasible 
and offers an efficient and fair way to proceed. The unity emerges from viewing debt as an increasingly 33 
equity-like instrument, which in the sovereign debt case implies treating it as a contingent claim in the 
spirit of Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) and Sims (2001). Krugman (1988, p. 253) notes that this is 
a valid construct also for new financing to tide over the debt overhang (legacy) problem. A unified 
treatment also creates a system that is also readily applicable to private debt, for which restructuring 
through debt-equity swaps is more conventional. 
  For legacy sovereign debt, easing the terms of official loans helps – and it helps all the more if 
the terms are made truly concessional. At some point, official debt may be, for all practical purposes, 
written down or, equivalently, made payable very far into the future. This, of course, does not work for 
sovereigns who have not yet borrowed from official sources. Even for those who have the buffer of 
official funding, an important concern with the present strategy is the de-facto subordination of official 
to private debt. The longer the maturities of official debt, the greater would be the resources available 
to repay private creditors. If this induces private creditors to lend new money to sovereigns – in the 
knowledge that these creditors will continue to be repaid – then the overall debt burden will remain 
high. Under official financing, the option value generated by future growth (or inflation) spurts accrues 
mainly to private creditors who may be tempted to take more risk. As Rogoff (2003) emphasises, 
“…the availability of IFI [International Financial Institutions] support gives a false sense of security to 
investors, which magnifies booms in the run-up to the crisis (as in Russia in 1998).” If the future does 
not unfold in a favourable manner, the present dilemmas will repeat themselves down the line with, 
possibly, more severe consequences.  
For this reason, a forward-looking discussion of debt strategy is needed. In the rest of this 
section, I first outline a proposal for new sovereign debt. Then, I suggest how that proposal can be used 
also to draw down the legacy sovereign debt. Finally, I discuss issues relating to private debt.  
   34 
Sovereign cocos 
 
Barkbu, Eichengreen, and Mody (2012) propose the idea of sovereign cocos, ‘contingent 
convertible’ bonds.
15 Under this proposal, debt contracts would contain automatic provisions for 
restructuring whenever the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded an agreed threshold. The debt-to-GDP 
ratio has clear economic significance for debt management, is measured with reasonable accuracy, 
and taking lagged values could also reduce the risks due to data revisions.
16 Upon reaching the 
threshold, repayment maturities could be extended; but the bonds could also have higher thresholds 
beyond which the debt repayment could be tied to economic and financial developments. An 
additional event triggering the change in the terms of repayment could also be the country’s need to 
seek official financial assistance (as proposed in the Deauville agreement and recently by Barr and 
Pienkowski, 2013), in which case the automatic restructuring provided will reduce the need for official 
assistance and, unlike at present, also reduce the aggregate debt repayment obligations. Each country 
would (for possibly each transaction) negotiate with creditors the debt-to-GDP threshold, the nature 
and extent of restructuring, and the price of the bond. The automaticity in the debt restructuring 
process would eliminate the discussion on whether or not to restructure, reduce the associated delays 
and costs of restructuring, and thereby lower the risk of financial instability and contagion. 
The sovereign cocos proposal has evident parallels with bank convertible capital (cocos) – 
bonds that are to be converted into equity when the bank’s equity capital falls below a threshold. Bank 
cocos are spreading in use, led by regulatory requirements, especially in Switzerland and the UK, and 
more recently in the United States. They are in the process of being incorporated in the Basel III capital 
structure. In the Swiss case, cocos have multiple thresholds: the bond may be converted into equity if 
the equity-to-assets ratio falls below 5 percent or, as in the case of one bank, if it falls below a higher 
                                                            
15 Proposals along this line start with Weber et al (2011) and include Pisani-Ferry, Vihriala, and Wolff (2013), and Barr and 
Pienkowski (2013).  
16 The literature on contingent capital for banks also discusses the possibility of market triggers, such as the level of 
spreads on Credit Default Swaps rather than the debt-to-GDP ratio, as determining the trigger for restructuring the debt.  35 
threshold of 7 percent. The Swiss regulator may also determine that a bond needs to be converted into 
equity to create additional loss absorption capacity and prevent a more expensive resolution process.  
The crisis has emphasised the need for greater equity buffers. For banks, Admati and Hellwig 
(2013) have proposed that banks hold much higher levels of equity. Bank cocos can be seen as a 
response – even if not perfect – to the movement towards greater equity holding. The key lesson from 
bank cocos is that a regulatory push was needed to persuade banks to move in that direction; 
however, once pushed, the initial objections regarding their complexity and pricing have diminished. 
Indeed, some banks are exploring the use of cocos even absent immediate regulatory pressure due to 
the perception that the market would view the additional buffer favourably. 
The concern with contingent debt is that the borrower may abuse the latitude offered by the 
easier restructuring. This is a problem with any form of contingent debt, not just the sovereign cocos 
proposed here. The bank cocos are subject to similar abuse: banks may acquire risky assets knowing 
they have an extra loss absorption capacity. Yet, banks are attracting investors as the use of cocos 
spreads. The only real way to completely prevent the inherent moral hazard is by defining the 
contingency in terms of an indicator that neither the borrower nor the lender can influence, e.g. 
commodity prices or earthquakes. Such independent events, however, are not well correlated with the 
‘exogenous’ component of the debt burden. However, despite the costs of moral hazard inherent in any 
realistic contingent debt proposal, the greater latitude provided to the borrower creates value for the 
lender via the ease of orderly debt restructuring and the borrower’s return to economic health. As 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) show in the context of collective action clauses, this trade-off is 
potentially beneficial to the parties on both sides of the transaction. In the proposed design of 
sovereign cocos, by extending the duration of repayment, the lender refinances the borrower with an 
in-built extent of ‘forgiveness’ and, if the thresholds are reasonably set, both parties stand to gain. 
Moreover, as the presumption of bailouts fade, more realistic default probability assessments by the 36 
lender should also allow for the emergence of higher interest rates charged on the debt and lower debt 
levels. 
Legacy sovereign debt  
 
The legacy sovereign debt presents more intractable problems since existing contracts need 
to be broken. The conventional restructuring strategy works through debt exchanges, whereby the old 
debt obligations are traded for new obligations with a negotiated lower net present value.
17 But debt 
exchanges create the problem of holdouts – the creditors who refuse to participate in the exchange. 
There is no perfect solution to this difficulty. Buchheit, Gulati, and Tirado (2013) propose an 
amendment to the ESM Treaty, which would prevent holdouts from gaining access to the distressed 
sovereign’s assets held within the territories defined by the ESM’s membership. Although, assets will 
likely also be held outside the restricted area, the proposal will considerably undermine incentives to 
holdout.  
There exists an additional challenge. Where the banks hold the much of the public debt, would 
sovereign debt restructuring not create the risk of bringing down the entire financial structure of the 
county? In principle, the response to this concern is straightforward. If the banks’ assets lose value – 
because the government is unable to honour its obligations to the banks – then the banks themselves 
need to be downscaled. In other words, the bank’s own debt must have an equity-like character to deal 
with loss in asset values. In the alleged interest of shielding the banking system, it is easy to maintain 
the fiction that the assets and liabilities are worth more than actually are. Such forbearance is liable to 
                                                            
17 Zingales (2011) proposed a debt exchange in which the outstanding value of the newly issued securities would be close 
to the prevailing market prices. For Italian bonds in September 2011, he estimated that the debt burden could be reduced 
by about 15 percent. Such transactions are subject to game-playing by the creditor and debtors alike. Perotti and Zingales 
(2011) suggested a tax levied on investors proportional to the price of Credit Default Swaps in the previous month. The 
revenues collected would help ease the sovereign debt burden. This is an attractive proposal but because ECB intervention 
influences the price and implied default risk of sovereign debt, the effectiveness of such a tax is diluted. 37 
create zombie banks while the underlying debt problems remain latent (or even grow in magnitude). 
Pushing bank restructuring into the future cannot help.
18  
   For banks, the key goal is to achieve efficient resolution (close them down, downsize them, 
and/or merge them with other banks). Here the approach is more straightforward. Connor and O’Kelley 
(2012, p. 1) argue that the bank regulator should have the authority to “override existing bank liability 
contracts in explicit, contingent circumstances.” They report on several triggers for conversion of debt 
to equity. These include the debt-to-asset ratio, debt-to-tangible asset ratio, market prices-to-book 
value, and market prices reflecting general conditions in the banking sector. Versoni and Zingales 
(2010) argue that such debt-equity swaps are the most effective mechanism for recapitalising banks, 
within virtually no cost to the public purse. 
  Finally, the same mechanism carries over to distressed private debt, such as home mortgages. 
For mortgages ‘under water’ (homes with values less than the loan amount), the repayment could be 
linked to the market price of the home (or the homes in the area) (see Posner and Zingales, 2009). 
Thus, instead of accumulating arrears based on the original contract, a new contract would align the 
payment due to the market price. For example, the starting debt burden under the new contract could 
be based on 80 percent of the current market value. If the market price rises, there could be scope for 
the bank to share some of the upside. In principle, this should not make a difference to the bank’s 
capital requirements if the expected losses had been properly accounted for. If they were not 
accounted for, then the debt owned by the bank would need to be converted into equity to recognise 
the fall in its asset values. No solution is without its own problems. Some homeowners with under 
water mortgages who can nevertheless afford to repay under the original contract and/or owners who 
had taken speculative positions that went bad will also achieve reprieve. Any mechanism to carve out 
                                                            
18 Preventing banks from reaching this state in the future is key lesson from the crisis. That the assets of the Cypriot 
banking sector reached 900 percent of GDP without an effort to scale them down reflects many regulatory and surveillance 
failures. 38 
such borrowers is challenging: the debt-to-equity conversion is a superior to other methods where the 
boundaries drawn are subject to greater abuse.  
The way forward  
 
  The likelihood that this crisis will be resolved without significantly more debt restructuring is 
small. In its scale and complexity, the euro-area crisis is like no other crisis before. The large weight of 
the euro area in world trade implies that internal European problems have spread to the world 
economy, which lowers the likelihood of an externally-induced demand stimulus to reignite growth. 
Five years of experience with fiscal austerity during this crisis have reaffirmed the historical 
ineffectiveness of austerity as a primary instrument of debt reduction. In contrast, the economic 
arguments for – and the historical record – favour using debt as a buffer against shocks to debt.  
The reluctance to proactively deploy debt restructuring has led to an ad hoc process of 
episodic imposition of losses on private creditors; since that has been insufficient, the only other 
option been increasingly concessional official financing. While concessional official financing is 
necessary to alleviate further economic and social distress, its inherent delays slows down the 
restructuring process, fosters divisions within the euro area, and creates terrible incentives for future 
private borrowing and lending decisions.  
The euro area needs a framework for orderly debt restructuring – to deal with this crisis and 
the next. The lack of exchange rate flexibility within the members of the euro area will inevitably 
generate future booms and busts. The current policy dilemmas will reappear. Even if a fiscal union 
were feasible to allow for unrequited transfers from a central community budget to distressed 
communities, a credible debt default and restructuring process must be in place. The process initiated 
at Deauville was a move in the right direction and the hasty retreat was unfortunate. With Cyprus, the 
European authorities have been inevitably pulled back to the Deauville policy direction through the 39 
route of bank debt that threatened to transform into sovereign debt. The high costs of the significant 
missteps and long delay in recognising the inevitability are being borne by the Cypriot people.  
Debt restructuring should ideally be automatic and continuous. While the degree of 
automaticity and continuity associated with pure equity contracts is not feasible, the design of debt 
instruments should accommodate as much flexibility as possible since such flexibility improves 
macroeconomic performance with limited offsetting costs. This is all the more so for sovereign debt, 
where the inflexibility can become a major source of instability.  
The proposal described in this paper has, I believe, several merits. Being grounded in a clear 
theoretical framework, it is intellectually attractive. Moreover, it does not need a European directive or 
treaty change. Allowing countries to pursue such decentralised options makes them more likely to be 
used compared to solutions that rely for their execution on collective European decisions. A point also 
in its favour is that the crisis is being resolved essentially through an ad hoc application of principle 
proposed: as countries reach their limits of debt repayment, debt is being renegotiated. 
19 
Unfortunately, the renegotiations are mainly with official creditors, making official debt, in effect, junior 
to private debt and creating severe problems for the future.  
The question often asked is whether a commitment to the restructuring of debt as a matter of 
policy is ever possible – is there some inevitability about the reliance on ad hoc restructuring. The best 
route to a credible commitment is through Europe’s own ‘no bailout’ rule. The European treaties prohibit 
the bailout of a European sovereign by other European sovereigns and agencies. The presumption 
during this crisis was that the official ‘no bailout’ commitment could be maintained while also 
honouring all obligations due to private creditors. As this crisis has ground on, it has become clearer 
that this does not work.  
                                                            
19 Darvas (2012) takes this to the logical extreme. The interest rate on Greek debt obligations to official creditors, he says, 
should be reduced to zero, the maturities extended substantially, and the principal due should be linked to GDP. 40 
Thus, in its treaties, Europe has a legitimate basis for – and now also the experience to validate 
– a sovereign debt restructuring system. A decisive approach in this direction will be good for the 
further management of the euro-area crisis. And because the move would set such a huge precedent, it 
would be good for the future of sovereign debt restructuring well beyond European borders and into the 
next crises.  41 
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